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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________________ 
 
No. 15-2061 
________________ 
 
KATHLEEN M. WILLIAMS, 
 
           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WELLS FARGO BANK 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D. C. Civil Action No. 5-14-cv-02345) 
District Judge:  Honorable Edward G. Smith  
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 on April 29, 2016 
 
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 10, 2016) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
                                            
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 Kathleen Williams appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
dismissing her Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) case against her former 
employer, Wells Fargo.  Williams has failed to set out a prima facie case of age 
discrimination.  Consequently, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
 In December 2012, Williams was a 54-year-old bank teller employed by a Wells 
Fargo Bank branch in Coopersburg, Pennsylvania.  Williams had worked as a bank teller 
for Wells Fargo and its predecessors since 1983.  As part of Williams’s job 
responsibilities, she was expected to look for new customers and make referrals to the 
bank in order to generate new business.  Williams’s sister, Phyllis Titus, was widowed, 
and Williams and her mother worried about Titus’s financial welfare.  According to 
Williams, her mother was interested in creating a trust for Titus, and she asked Williams 
to look into whether Wells Fargo offered any such products.  To this end, Williams began 
making relevant inquiries, allegedly with Titus’s knowledge and consent.  
 According to Wells Fargo, Titus visited a local Wells Fargo branch and reported 
concerns that Williams had made strange comments to Titus about her accounts.  Wells 
Fargo opened an investigation and determined that between August and November 2012, 
Williams had accessed Titus’s checking and credit card accounts 27 times.  Although a 
Wells Fargo investigator found no evidence of fraudulent activity, Williams’s District 
Manager, Marla Walczak, and her Employee Relations Consultant, John Follette, were 
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notified about the activity on Titus’s accounts.  Walczak and Follette reviewed the matter 
to determine whether Williams had violated the Wells Fargo Code of Ethics and Business 
Conduct, which prohibits Wells Fargo employees from accessing confidential 
information without a business purpose.  Walczak and Follette determined that 
Williams’s explanation did not justify the number of times she accessed Titus’s accounts, 
stating that Williams would not have needed to access Titus’s accounts more than once in 
order to help her mother open a trust account or to determine Titus’s eligibility for other 
Wells Fargo products.  Furthermore, Wells Fargo’s policies require that a potential 
customer be entered as a referral into the Wells Fargo teller system as soon as a teller has 
gained consent from the client for the referral.  Despite her repeated access of Titus’s 
accounts, Williams did not enter any referrals for Titus into the Wells Fargo teller system.  
Thus, Walczak and Follette concluded that Williams’s conduct violated Wells Fargo 
procedures and decided to terminate Williams’s employment.  
 Williams brought suit against Wells Fargo in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging age discrimination in violation of the 
ADEA.1  Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment, claiming that Williams had failed 
to set out a prima facie case of age discrimination.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment, finding that “[c]onfronted with the plaintiff’s version in this matter, no 
reasonable jury could infer that the defendant had discriminated against her.”  Williams 
now appeals. 
                                            
1 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. 
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II.2 
 The ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals on the 
basis of age.3  In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, as here, a plaintiff may 
prove age discrimination according to the burden-shifting framework set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.4  Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the initial 
burden of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.5  In order to set out 
a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA, Williams must show that she (1) 
was a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified for the position she held, (3) 
suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) was replaced by a sufficiently younger 
person so as to create an inference of age discrimination.6   
 It is undisputed that Williams has met her burden with respect to the first three 
requirements.7  Thus, we confine our initial inquiry to the question of whether Williams 
                                            
2 The District Court exercised jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s decision to grant 
summary judgment.  Gardner v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 544 F.3d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 
2008).  Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”   
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  The court must view any evidence in favor of the nonmoving party 
and extend any reasonable favorable inferences to that party.  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 
372, 378 (2007). 
3 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).  
4 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973); see Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 
1108 (3d Cir. 1997). 
5 Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 689-91 (3d Cir. 2009). 
6 Id. at 689-90.  
7 Any person over the age of 40 is a member of a protected class for the purposes of the 
ADEA, and Williams was 54 years old at the time she was fired.  Wells Fargo does not 
dispute that Williams was qualified for the position, or that she suffered an adverse 
employment action.     
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was replaced by a sufficiently younger employee.  Williams alleges that she was replaced 
by two younger employees:  Pamela Englert and Jennifer Kucheruck, who were ages 29 
and 31, respectively, at the time Williams was terminated.  The District Court found that 
Williams’s assertions were wholly unsupported by record evidence, relying entirely upon 
Williams’s own affidavit.  The affidavit states, in relevant part, “immediately prior to my 
firing, two young tellers were [h]ired in anticipation of my termination [Pamela Englert 
born 1983 and hired November 6, 2012 and Jennifer Kucheruck born 1981 and hired 
November 6, 2012].”   
 While on summary judgment, the court does examine all evidence in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving party “cannot rely on 
unsupported allegations, but must go beyond pleadings and provide some evidence that 
would show that there exists a genuine issue for trial.”8  Bare assertions, conclusory 
allegations, or suspicions are insufficient to defeat summary judgment.9  There is ample 
evidence provided by Wells Fargo that Englert and Kucheruck were hired more than a 
month before Williams was terminated in order to fill vacancies created by the departure 
of other Wells Fargo tellers in May and August – not to replace Williams.  Wells Fargo 
has provided further evidence that Williams was replaced by Judith Griffiths, who was 54 
years old at the time of hiring.  Thus, Williams has failed to provide sufficient evidence 
that she was replaced by a sufficiently younger person so as to create an inference of age 
discrimination.  
                                            
8 Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000).  
9 Fireman’s Ins. Co. v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982).  
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 Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that Williams has met her burden of setting 
out a prima facie case of age discrimination, Wells Fargo has asserted a non-
discriminatory reason for firing her:  she violated their Code of Ethics.  Where, as here, 
an employer has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse action, 
the burden returns to the plaintiff to present evidence that the reason provided by the 
employer is pretextual.10  Such evidence must allow a factfinder to reasonably infer that 
the defendant’s proffered non-discriminatory reason was “either a post hoc fabrication or 
otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action.”11  While Williams did 
present evidence that she was acting with Titus’s permission, Williams is unable to 
dispute Wells Fargo’s finding that her actions violated prescribed business procedures.  
Therefore, Williams has failed to demonstrate that Wells Fargo’s alleged rationale in 
firing her was pretextual, and summary judgment was properly granted for Wells Fargo. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
                                            
10 Smith, 589 F.3d at 690. 
11 Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 467 (3d Cir. 2005). 
